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ABSTRACT: As part of a systemwide transformation, the VA formed its National Center 
for Patient Safety to foster an organizational culture of safety within its nationwide net-
work of hospitals and outpatient clinics. A recent medical team training program designed 
to improve communication among operating room staff was associated with a reduction 
in surgical mortality and improvements in quality of care, on-time surgery starts, and 
staff morale. The program is now being expanded to other clinical units, along with a 
patient engagement program that prevents errors by facilitating communication relating 
to patients’ daily care plans. A recognition program stimulated facilities to conduct time-
lier and higher-quality root-cause analyses of reported safety events to identify stronger 
actions for preventing their recurrence. Other initiatives have reduced rates of health care–
associated infections, patient mortality, and post-operative complications. Success factors 
include leadership accountability for performance and organizational support for testing, 
expanding, and adopting improvements.
    
OVERVIEW
In the decade since the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued its landmark report To 
Err Is Human, there have been a number of successful efforts to improve patient 
safety in the United States.1 Nevertheless, the nation appears to be far from real-
izing the goal of eliminating the harm inflicted on some patients by care that is 
meant to help them.2 A series of Commonwealth Fund case studies conducted on 
the fifth anniversary of the IOM report identified several health care organiza-
tions that had taken promising steps toward realizing one of the IOM’s key rec-
ommendations: creating an organizational culture of safety.3
This case study, part of a new series documenting the progress that can 
be achieved with sustained effort, provides a fifth-year update on patient safety 
initiatives at one of the sites profiled earlier: the U.S. Department of Veterans 
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Affairs (VA).4 The VA’s National Center for Patient 
Safety has led a decade-long effort to equip staff with 
the analytic tools and know-how to improve patient 
safety. The center recently tested and implemented a 
series of team-training programs, adapted from the avi-
ation industry, to help staff develop an attentiveness to 
situations in which human errors can occur as well as 
teamwork skills for effectively communicating safety 
concerns and correcting unsafe conditions. 
Early results of team training for operating room 
staff, following implementation of checklist-guided 
preoperative briefings and postoperative debriefings, 
include significantly improved staff perceptions of 
safety, a 50 percent greater reduction in risk-adjusted 
surgical mortality at trained versus untrained facilities, 
a 12 percent increase in the provision of treatment to 
prevent blood clots, increased on-time surgery starts, 
and a 33 percent decline in nursing turnover. In a 
related pilot program to engage patients in safety, floor 
nurses reported that errors were averted on 21 percent 
to 35 percent of shifts during which patients were edu-
cated about their daily plan of hospital care. 
The VA also established an Inpatient Evaluation 
Center and a Surgical Quality Improvement Program 
to develop valid and comparable measures of patient 
outcomes at the facility level, as well as resources for 
clinicians and managers to improve performance over 
time. This capability supports patient safety and quality 
improvement initiatives that have contributed to:
•	 a more than threefold reduction from 2006 to 
2010 in rates of device-associated bloodstream 
infections and pneumonia in intensive care units 
(ICUs); 
•	 a 76 percent reduction in antibiotic-resistant 
health care–associated infections in ICUs and 
28 percent lower rates in other acute-care units 
from 2007 to 2009;
•	 reductions in hospital and 30-day mortality 
rates of 20 percent and 33 percent, respectively, 
among ICU patients between 2002–2004 and 
2010; and
•	 reductions in 30-day postoperative mortality and 
morbidity rates of 59 percent and 51 percent, 
respectively, between 1991 and 2009.
A culture of attentiveness to patient safety 
appears to be taking hold. For example, in a recent sur-
vey, VA staff gave significantly higher ratings to some 
important dimensions of their facility’s safety culture, 
such as senior management’s awareness of risks to 
patient safety and actions taken to promote safety. A 
facility recognition program, meanwhile, has led to 
a doubling over four years in the proportion of root-
cause analyses completed in a timely manner following 
reported safety incidents, and in analyses that identi-
fied stronger actions with metrics and management 
support for improvement. And there was a fivefold 
increase from 2000 to 2010 in analyses undertaken on 
a discretionary basis.
The VA’s commitment to improving patient 
safety and quality of care has given rise to a number of 
approaches: holding leaders at multiple levels account-
able for adopting  system improvement, while also 
recognizing their successes in doing so; improving 
communication and teamwork so that staff are empow-
ered to voice concerns about safety; and providing 
individual facilities with training, practical tools, data 
feedback, coaching, and opportunities to initiate and 
participate in safety-improvement pilot programs that 
may be expanded within a facility and throughout the 
VA as a whole.
“We must and will transform VA into the high-perform-
ing, well-disciplined, transparent, and accountable 
organization we know it’s capable of being. Three 
hundred thousand good people come to work 
every day to serve veterans. We must focus all of their 
efforts on providing veterans the highest quality and 
safety in benefits and services.”
Secretary Eric K. Shinseki, Department of 
Veterans Affairs, Strategic Plan, June 2010
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ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT FOR PATIENT 
SAFETY IMPROVEMENT
Organization
The Veterans Health Administration, a component of 
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, operates the 
nation’s largest publicly funded integrated health care 
system, serving 5.8 million patients in 1,400 care sites 
located in every state, the District of Columbia, and 
some U.S. territories. Facilities include 153 VA medi-
cal centers, 783 community-based outpatient clinics, 
and 135 nursing homes, as well as residential rehabili-
tation treatment programs, readjustment counseling 
centers, and home-care programs. During the 1990s, 
the VA health care system was decentralized into 21 
regional networks throughout the U.S. that manage 
funding and provide accountability to individual sites 
(Exhibit 1).5 
More than 8 million of the nation’s 23 million 
veterans have enrolled to receive services from the VA. 
Access to care is prioritized based on veterans’ service-
connected disabilities and exposures, income, and other 
factors. Hence, many veterans who receive health care 
from the VA also receive services from other providers. 
The VA essentially acts as a safety net for veterans’ 
health care; those who depend on the VA for care tend 
to be sicker and older, with lower incomes than the 
general population.
Responding to widespread concerns about the 
quality of care in its facilities, the agency undertook a 
transformation during the 1990s to reorient its health 
care system toward higher performance, while at the 
same time shifting its focus toward outpatient pri-
mary care.6 The VA was an early leader in developing 
a systemwide electronic health record (EHR), which 
enables performance measurement and accountability 
for improvement.7 A recent study found that adherence 
to recommended processes of care was generally better 
in the VA than in other care settings in the U.S., while 
rates of risk-adjusted mortality were similar.8
Laying the Foundation
Patient safety has been an important thrust in the VA’s 
transformation efforts since 1997—two years before 
the publication of To Err Is Human—and is one aspect 
of the agency’s strategic plan for veteran-centric care.9 
In 1999, the VA created its National Center for Patient 
Safety (NCPS) under the direction of James Bagian, M.D., 
Exhibit 1. Veterans Integrated Service Networks
Source: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.
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its recently retired chief patient safety officer. Based in 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, the NCPS develops and dissemi-
nates programs that engage frontline staff and manage-
ment in systems learning by encouraging safety event 
reporting without punishment—which in turn requires 
distinguishing errors from blameworthy acts—and by 
providing training and tools to help staff analyze the 
causes of errors and identify effective means of pre-
venting them. (These efforts have been described in 
previous reports.10)
The VA’s patient safety efforts are noteworthy 
in that they have the potential to influence medical 
practice both in the U.S. and abroad. The vast major-
ity of physicians trained in the United States receive 
at least some of their residency training within the VA 
system, which exposes them to the VA’s approach to 
patient safety through participation in activities such 
as grand rounds (medical education sessions attended 
by physicians and medical residents to discuss illus-
trative patient cases) and the team-training programs 
described below. The VA and the NCPS also developed 
Patient Safety Curriculum Workshops that train fac-
ulty to teach patient safety principles and techniques 
to medical residents and students.11 The VA’s tools, 
methods, and/or educational materials have influenced, 
and in some cases been adopted by, safety programs in 
Australia, Denmark, Sweden, the U.S. Department of 
Defense, and private health care systems throughout 
the United States, according to the NCPS.
STRATEGIES AND TOOLS FOR CHANGE
This report focuses on several recent efforts to improve 
patient safety at the VA, which are first described in 
general and then illustrated through the example of the 
James H. Quillen “Mountain Home” Veterans Affairs 
Medical Center in rural Johnson City, Tennessee. These 
efforts include:
•	 medical team training to institute checklist-
based briefing and debriefing methods in operat-
ing rooms and intensive care units; 
•	 nursing crew resource management training to 
enhance communication and teamwork around 
critical nursing tasks in general patient care 
units; and 
•	 the “Daily Plan,” which educates and actively 
involves patients in helping to ensure safe and 
patient-centered care.
Medical Team Training 
In 2006, the NCPS, under James Bagian, began sys-
temwide implementation of a medical team training 
program that it had been pilot-testing since 2003, with 
an initial focus on operating rooms and intensive care 
units.12 Bagian had purposefully delayed implementing 
the program across the VA until after the organization 
had accomplished other key goals, such as achieving 
widespread use of safety event reporting and effec-
tive root-cause analyses of critical events. “You have 
to have a base level of understanding or acceptance of 
safety culture to even start to do it,” he notes. 
The VA adapted its medical team training pro-
gram from the crew resource management (CRM) 
concept used in the aviation industry to improve com-
munication, leadership, and decision-making in airline 
cockpits, where human error can have devastating con-
sequences.13 CRM emphasizes the need to anticipate 
human performance limitations and to adopt counter-
vailing behaviors and techniques—such as assertive 
inquiry by crew members when they observe potential 
safety threats—to prevent mistakes or mitigate their 
effects. The VA focused its medical team training on 
improving communication among staff, since commu-
nication problems had been implicated in three-quar-
ters of safety incidents examined across VA facilities.14 
The NCPS implemented the medical team train-
ing program in three phases at each VA facility (as 
described below). This approach reflected the national 
faculty’s belief—subsequently validated by experi-
ence—that adequate preparation and follow-up mentor-
ing would be essential to achieve successful behavior 
change.15
1. The participating facility formed a local imple-
mentation team consisting of key medical, 
nursing, and administrative leaders as well as 
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frontline providers. National program faculty 
held preparatory calls with the local team to 
discuss the program and help develop a project 
plan (including metrics) for improving commu-
nication at the facility. 
2. The facility hosted a day-long interactive train-
ing session conducted by national faculty, dur-
ing which the operating suite was closed to 
elective cases so that all staff would be available 
to participate (Exhibit 2). The training featured 
lectures, discussions, role-playing, video, and 
simulation to demonstrate both effective and 
ineffective communication scenarios, to teach 
communication skills such as voicing safety 
concerns, and to introduce tools such as brief-
ings guided by a checklist. Following the train-
ing, the implementation team planned next steps 
with the goal of instituting briefings within 72 
hours.
3. The national faculty conducted quarterly tele-
phone follow-up consultations with the local 
team for one year to assess the progress of 
implementation and to offer coaching and 
advice on how to overcome obstacles and 
achieve success.
VA facilities use the checklists in two ways: 
1) to guide preoperative briefings to ensure that team 
members have a common understanding of the specific 
plan for an operation; and 2) to guide postoperative 
debriefings in which team members assess problems 
for correction, such as defective equipment in need of 
repair, and opportunities for improvement. The abil-
ity to identify and fix problems proves very effective 
in overcoming skepticism and convincing staff about 
the usefulness of the briefing and debriefing process, 
Bagian notes. 
The checklist was an important tool for stan-
dardizing procedure within each facility, but the VA 
eschewed a mechanistic approach to its use. “The 
briefings and debriefings create a conversation where 
communication can be far richer and [more] com-
prehensive than simplistic use of a checklist in a rote 
manner,” Bagian says. Each facility developed its own 
checklist (using a whiteboard, paper document, or 
electronic display) based on its specific needs, though 
the NCPS offered guidance by developing a national 
template based on elements commonly used across 
the initial sites (Appendix A). Local customization 
“makes it more readily accepted and gives it a higher 
utility” for the local care teams, Bagian says. He notes 
that this process resulted in a checklist that anticipated 
the “spirit and intent” of the surgical safety checklist 
recently developed by the World Health Organization, 
while also being more comprehensive in its approach.16
Results of Medical Team Training. By 2009, 
medical team training had been implemented in operat-
ing rooms and intensive care units in virtually all of 
Exhibit 2. VA Medical Team Training: Key Content
Communication Techniques 
•	 “Feel	the	Pinch,	Speak	Up”
•	 “Read	Back”
•	 “Call	Out”
•	 “Assertiveness”
Patient Safety Tools
•	 Briefings	and	Debriefings
•	 Structured,	Standardized	Handoffs
•	 Interdisciplinary	Patient-Centered	Rounds
•	 Administrative	Rounds
Source: VA National Center for Patient Safety.
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the 130 VA medical centers that provide surgical ser-
vices through on-site training, involving almost 14,000 
staff members. The NCPS evaluated the clinical and 
operational effects of the program through quarterly 
follow-up phone calls to the training sites, staff sur-
veys, and standardized outcomes data collected by the 
VA Surgical Quality Improvement Program (described 
below).
All facilities implemented surgical briefings, 
although smaller facilities were more likely to do so 
across all surgical cases and services.17 Based on the 
observations of program faculty, the strongest predic-
tor of a successful uptake and dissemination of surgi-
cal briefings within a facility was the involvement 
of the facility’s leadership at the time of the on-site 
training session.18 Involvement of the operating room 
nurse manager in the planning stages of the program 
also led to higher rates of briefing implementation.19 
Most facilities (95%) reported implementing at least 
one other related activity such as administrative brief-
ings, interdisciplinary rounds in patient units, or other 
structured communication techniques. Results to date 
include the following:
•	 Improved	teamwork. Eighty-two percent of the 
operating room staff surveyed using the Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire reported that teamwork 
improved.20 Across 37 of the facilities that were 
the first to implement training, surgical staff rat-
ings of patient safety and teamwork improved 
significantly from the baseline period prior to 
training through the follow-up period nine to 12 
months later (Exhibit 3).
•	 Improved	quality	of	care. Across 74 of the 
facilities that first implemented training, receipt 
of treatment to prevent blood clots increased 
from 85 percent of patients before training to 95 
percent after training; timely receipt of prophy-
lactic antibiotics increased from 92 percent to 97 
percent of patients.21 Most facilities reported a 
“success story” or the prevention of at least one 
undesirable event as a result of checklist-guided 
briefings.
•	 Improved	efficiency. Operative time per case 
decreased in 29 percent of 110 facilities sur-
veyed; on-time surgery starts for the first case of 
the day increased in 54 percent of the facilities; 
and 63 percent reported better use of equipment. 
Moreover, most operating room staff surveyed 
(79%) agreed that efficiency had improved.
•	 Improved	staff	morale. Nursing turnover 
decreased by one-third in the year following 
team training at initial sites, from 9 percent to 
6 percent in 45 operating rooms and from 12 
Exhibit 3. Effects of Medical Team Training in the Operating Room: 
Safety Attitude Questionnaire Scores
*p < 0.05 paired, students t-test.
Source: VA National Center for Patient Safety,  N=37 Facilities and 3,138 Safety Attitudes Questionnaires.
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Physicians and nurses here work 
together as a well-coordinated team
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percent to 8 percent in 35 surgical intensive care 
units. 
•	 Improved	patient	outcomes. The 30-day 
postoperative mortality rate declined by 18 
percent over one year among 74 VA facilities 
that implemented medical team training in 2007 
and 2008, as compared to no significant decline 
among 34 facilities that had not yet been trained. 
The reduction in risk-adjusted mortality was 
50 percent greater in the trained facilities after 
controlling for potentially confounding factors. 
The intervention exhibited a “dose-response” 
effect—facilities with longer periods of imple-
mentation and greater reported use of checklist-
guided surgical briefing and debriefing had 
lower mortality rates (Exhibit 4).22,23
Bagian believes that pilot-testing the CRM pro-
gram before implementing it systemwide allowed for 
the creation of an effective program that was widely 
accepted by participants. Staff surveys bear this out: 
90 percent of participating staff report that CRM train-
ing is a good idea. This experience appears to validate 
the hypothesis that safety principles of the aviation 
industry can be successfully adapted to health care and 
that communication and teamwork skills are important 
to ensuring good patient outcomes. 
Extending the Teamwork Approach: 
Nursing Crew Resource Management
In the summer of 2009, the VA expanded its CRM 
strategy to reach additional patient care units. A team 
of nurses led by Gary Sculli, R.N., M.S.N., who had 
experience using and teaching aviation CRM as an air-
line pilot, developed a nursing CRM program geared 
toward frontline nurses. The goal of the program is to 
enhance patient safety by improving the communica-
tion and teamwork essential to critical nursing tasks. 
The NCPS selected 10 of the 40 pilot sites that applied 
to test the program. (The experience of one of those 
pilot sites is described on page 10.) 
NCPS staff conducted a six-hour interactive 
learning session at each pilot site. The training used 
simulations of common clinical scenarios to educate 
nurses on risks to patients and how to reduce them by 
maintaining situational awareness, using tools such as 
checklists and briefings, improving communication 
about patient care, and avoiding distractions during 
Exhibit 4. Relationship Between Medical Team Training and 
30-Day Postsurgical Mortality at 74 Veterans Affairs Medical Centers
Copyright © 2010 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission. Note: Quarters 
represent implementation of checklist-guided briengs following receipt of medical team training (baseline = no 
training). Mortality was dened as patient death in or out of the hospital from any cause within 30 days after a 
major noncardiac surgical operation performed at the VA medical centers. Linear trend line was tted to the 
average risk-adjusted mortality rate (N=5). Error bars indicate 95% condence intervals.
Source: J. Neily, P. D. Mills, Y. Young-Xu et al., “Association Between Implementation of a Medical Team Training 
Program and Surgical Mortality,” Journal of the American Medical Association, Oct. 20, 2010, 304(15):1693–700. 
Average risk-adjusted mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 procedures)
0
5
10
15
20
25
17 17
15
12 12
Quarters of Training Program
0 (N=74) 
baseline
2 (N=20)1 (N=16) 3 (N=24) 4 (N=14)
8 the coMMonwealth FunD
critical tasks (Exhibit 5). Following the training, each 
pilot site implemented at least one CRM-based tool.24
The training program introduces two general 
types of checklists. “Read and verify” checklists serve 
as a quick reference to ensure that all appropriate steps 
are completed for normal and routine tasks, such as 
inserting intravenous lines (e.g., as a reminder to dis-
pose of needles properly and remove the tourniquet 
from the patient’s arm when done). “Read and do” 
checklists are meant to be used as a step-by-step guide 
to ensure an effective response to unusual or “abnormal 
and emergent” events, such as deteriorating vital signs 
in an unresponsive patient. In general, checklists are 
designed to: 
•	 standardize procedures and guide clinical 
actions and decisions in order to reduce errors of 
omission and commission, 
•	 guide less-experienced staff in appropriate 
technique,  
•	 increase situational awareness, and 
•	 increase accurate clinical assessments and 
decisions. 
One of the “human factors” addressed by nurs-
ing CRM is the asymmetric communication styles 
adopted by individuals within a professional hierarchy, 
whether among captain and crew in airline cockpits 
or among physicians and nurses in health care set-
tings.25 Junior staff are often hesitant to “speak up” to 
authority, leading them to adopt a communication style 
of “hinting” at what is meant and “hoping” that the 
meaning is taken. Likewise, those in authority often 
fail to listen to and consider the concerns of subordi-
nates, with serious implications for safety. CRM seeks 
to reduce this authority gradient through assertive com-
munication techniques that help all members of a team 
focus on safely and reliably completing a common task 
(Exhibit 6). 
Early Results and Next Steps. Pilot sites such as 
the Mountain Home VA report that nursing CRM is 
improving teamwork and communication in nurs-
ing units and that nurses are asking for more tools 
to support their improvement efforts. The program’s 
effect will be formally measured through the use of a 
nursing questionnaire, the VA’s Survey of Healthcare 
Experiences of Patients, and a distraction observation 
tool. Based on experience with other similar programs, 
anticipated outcomes may include reduced distractions 
and errors during critical tasks, improved task effi-
ciency, and increased patient and staff satisfaction.26 
The VA is planning to broaden the program’s 
scope to encompass a clinical team-training initiative 
geared toward all staff with a direct or indirect role in 
patient care on medical/surgical floors. “We envision 
our health care being delivered by a team that includes 
nurses, unit clerks, even the housekeeping staff on 
the ward…as well as the physicians,” says William 
Duncan, M.D., Ph.D., the VA’s associate deputy under-
secretary for health for quality and safety. “You have 
to improve communication between everybody on the 
team” to realize the full potential of such a program, 
Duncan says.
Exhibit 5. Nursing Crew Resource Management Training Topics/Modules
1.	 Introduction:	Crew	Resource	Management	and	the	Culture	of	Safety	
2.	 Leadership,	Teamwork,	and	Communication	
3.	 Situational	Awareness	
4.	 Briefings,	Debriefings,	and	Checklists	
5.	 Distractions	and	Fatigue	
6.	 Simulation
Source: VA National Center for Patient Safety.
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The Patient’s Role in Patient Safety:  
The Daily Plan
The NCPS initiated a pilot program, led by Beth J. 
King, R.N., B.S.N., M.A., at six local sites in 2007 to 
see if informing patients daily about their plan of care 
would increase their participation in care planning and 
identify opportunities to prevent errors, whether of 
omission or commission. “We wanted patients to be 
involved in their care and in safety,” said Amanda Fore, 
R.N., M.S., nurse coordinator and program analyst for 
the VA’s NCPS, “but we realized that oftentimes they 
didn’t know what to say because they didn’t know 
what was going to happen to them in the hospital.” 
In response, the VA developed the Daily Plan 
to facilitate direct, purposeful communication between 
the patient and the medical team. At a typical pilot site, 
such as the Mountain Home VA Medical Center in 
rural Johnson City, Tennessee, a floor nurse will check 
a patient-specific printout or “itinerary” generated by 
the VA’s EHR and then sit with the patient to review 
his or her Daily Plan for the day (patients may choose 
not to participate). The patient is given a copy to keep 
in an envelope by the bedside. The Daily Plan includes:
•	 what medications are to be administered, and 
when, 
•	 which tests or procedures are scheduled, 
•	 dietary needs as they affect meals, and 
•	 laboratory tests to be done. 
Nurses encourage patients to share the informa-
tion in the Daily Plan with family and to ask questions 
and raise concerns about its accuracy. The process 
empowers patients (and family members) to speak 
up when they observe that something is not going as 
planned, such as when an expected test is not done or 
when an unexpected medication is given. It also helps 
patients set expectations about their stay, such as know-
ing when they will be skipping a meal because of a 
scheduled test. The Daily Plan can also facilitate shared 
decision-making with patients, as physicians and medi-
cal residents make daily patient rounds, especially 
regarding changes in medications during the course of 
the hospital stay. 
Results of the Daily Plan. The initial pilot demon-
strated that patients liked receiving the Daily Plan and 
that it was an effective tool for preventing medical 
errors. VA nurses at five pilot sites reported that on 21 
percent to 35 percent of shifts during which the Daily 
Plan was employed, errors of commission and omis-
sion were averted through the collaborative interaction 
of the patient and the nurse.27 For example, the Daily 
Plan identified and helped to correct or prevent errors 
such as incorrect allergy information, unintended 
exams, incorrect medication orders, and misidentified 
next-of-kin for emergency notifications. 
In a survey of patients who volunteered to com-
plete an anonymous evaluation, 70 percent agreed that 
the Daily Plan increased their understanding of what 
Exhibit 6. Example of Assertive Communication Using the “Three Ws”
A	physician	orders	an	intravenous	fluid	infusion	for	a	patient.	Upon	assessment,	the	registered	nurse	notes	that	the	
patient	is	developing	respiratory	distress.	The	nurse	notifies	the	physician	using	a	communication	technique	called	
the	three	Ws:	
•	 What	I	see:	a	patient	who	is	short	of	breath.	
•	 What	I	am	concerned	about:	possible	fluid	overload	if	the	intravenous	fluids	are	administered.
•	 What	I	want:	that	you	assess	the	patient	prior	to	administering	intravenous	fluids.	
The	outcome	is	the	discontinuation	of	intravenous	fluids,	early	intervention	for	respiratory	distress,	and	the	preven-
tion	of	further	complications.				
Source: VA National Center for Patient Safety.
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was going to happen to them that day (Exhibit 7). Two-
thirds agreed that they were more comfortable because 
they knew what was going to happen that day, that the 
Daily Plan made it easier to ask questions, and that the 
Daily Plan provided information that helped improve 
their care. Moreover, 44 percent reported asking about 
discrepancy between planned and actual care, and 44 
percent reported that a family member had done so. 
Feedback has been consistent from surveys conducted 
in a second phase of the intervention in which addi-
tional pilot sites joined the program. 
The Daily Plan is now being used in 30 VA 
facilities nationwide and work is underway to improve 
its usability for both patients and staff.
TAKING SAFETY TO THE LOCAL LEVEL:  
THE CASE OF MOUNTAIN HOME
The ultimate success of the VA’s national programs 
depends on their uptake within the VA’s individual 
facilities. To illustrate that relationship, this report 
offers a closer look at one of those facilities: the James 
H. Quillen Veterans Affairs Medical Center, in rural 
Johnson City, Tennessee (population 62,000) (Exhibit 
8). The medical center, known as Mountain Home 
in recognition of its origins as a soldiers’ home, has 
embraced the safety strategies and tools offered by the 
VA’s national office and in so doing has promoted the 
transformation of its local organizational culture and 
practices to emphasize patient safety.
Instituting Surgical Briefings at  
Mountain Home
The Mountain Home VA medical center completed 
medical team training in January 2008, and imple-
mented preoperative briefings and postoperative 
debriefings guided by a paper checklist. For the preop-
erative briefings, all surgical team members participate 
in a short meeting in the operating room just prior 
to anesthesia induction. The briefing strengthens the 
team’s situational awareness through checklist-guided 
items (Appendix B) that: 
•	 highlight vital patient characteristics such as 
medication allergies, 
•	 verify the readiness of needed equipment and 
supplies, 
•	 assure that standard infection prevention proto-
cols have been followed, and 
Exhibit 7. The Daily Plan: Patient Perceptions 
at Five VA Medical Center Pilot Sites
N=108 patient responses. 
Source: VA National Center for Patient Safety.
Overall, I believe The Daily Plan 
provided me with information that 
helped improve my care
After reviewing The Daily Plan, my family 
asked about something that was different 
than they had expected it to be
 
If my medical care was different than I had 
expected it to be, I brought up the question 
because I had The Daily Plan
Having The Daily Plan made it 
easier for me to ask my nurses 
and doctors questions
After getting The Daily Plan, I was more 
comfortable because I knew what was 
going to happen that day in the hospital
The Daily Plan increased my understanding 
of what was going to happen to me during 
that day of my hospital stay
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•	 review the fire safety risk (for example, related 
to the use of oxygen). 
Conducting the briefing before the patient is 
anesthetized allows time to correct any last-minute 
problems, such as missing equipment, or to cancel the 
surgery if necessary without putting the patient at risk, 
according to Brenda Collier, R.N., M.B.A., the operat-
ing room nurse manager. A subsequent time-out, con-
ducted by the circulating nurse in the operating room 
just prior to the surgical incision, allows the team to re-
verify critical information (e.g., patient, procedure, and 
surgical site) as required under the Joint Commission’s 
universal protocol.
The surgeon leading the briefing offers all staff 
members the opportunity to raise questions or con-
cerns. “Surgeons used to be captain of the ship,” says 
surgeon Thomas Scott, M.D., who had prior experience 
with CRM during a tour of duty in the military. “Now, 
we have a classroom structure that empowers everyone 
to question or stop.” Staff also call for a “safety check” 
during longer surgeries where everyone in the operat-
ing room pauses to verify critical issues such as anti-
biotics, patient glucose levels, and other patient vital 
signs as well as equipment functioning. 
During debriefings, which are led by a regis-
tered nurse immediately following the surgical proce-
dure, team members are encouraged to raise issues they 
noticed during surgery, without fear of criticism. Any 
problems or potential problems are analyzed with the 
goal of identifying and correcting minor issues before 
they become major ones.28 The facility also identi-
fies improvement needs by analyzing standard data 
on patient morbidity and mortality derived from its 
participation in the VA Surgical Quality Improvement 
Program.
Mountain Home implemented interdisciplin-
ary administrative briefings following medical team 
training. The surgical team—including the head sur-
geon, surgical nurse, and technician—and a supply, 
processing, and distribution (SPD) representative meet 
biweekly to ensure that everyone is prepared for each 
surgical procedure scheduled for the following two 
weeks. The meetings allow the team to resolve equip-
ment, scheduling, and staffing issues, offer opportuni-
ties for staff to ask questions, and allow for organized 
discussion of and planning for postsurgical needs. 
The day before the surgery, key staff members meet 
again to confirm the surgical case lineup as well as 
supply and/or equipment needs. The team reports that 
Rogersville
Note: CBOC = Community-Based Outpatient Clinic.
Source: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.
Exhibit 8. Mountain Home VA Service Area
Mountain Home VAMC
Knoxville Outpatient 
Clinic
Rogersville, Bristol, VA, 
and Norton, VA CBOCs
Rural Outreach Clinics
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exposure to CRM through the medical team training 
program—created the supportive environment that 
nurses needed to adopt CRM principles in their interac-
tions with the medical staff.
Mountain Home nurses chose to focus their 
yearlong nursing CRM project on implementing a 
“sterile cockpit” paradigm in an inpatient medical– 
surgical oncology care unit. Sterile cockpit refers to an 
aviation rule requiring airline pilots to avoid distrac-
tions from nonessential activity during critical phases 
of flight such as takeoff and landing, when there is 
heightened risk of mishaps. In health care, administer-
ing medications to patients at the bedside is considered 
a common critical task because errors during this time 
can cause significant harm to patients.29
Floor nurses deployed a medication administra-
tion checklist to ensure correct dosage, correct medica-
tion, correct patient, and correct time of drug admin-
istration (Appendix C). They also began using visual 
aids to help avoid distractions when giving medication 
to patients. The visual aids include wearing an orange 
vest, displaying a warning sign on the medication cart, 
or simply raising the palm of the hand.30 Once unit 
nurses gain experience using these techniques for gen-
eral medication administration tasks, nursing managers 
plan to expand it to address specific high-risk tasks 
such as heparin and chemotherapy infusions.
Nursing unit managers at Mountain Home (who 
typically have master’s-level training) have built evalu-
ation into the design of the project by testing the ben-
efit of adding a registered nurse and/or nursing assis-
tant to “run interference” against potential distractions 
(e.g., intercepting phone calls, responding to patient 
call lights, answering questions unrelated to medica-
tions) in addition to using visual aids. Results are 
being assessed by tracking the number of distractions 
observed by the medication nurse and the time required 
to complete medication administration.
The nursing CRM program also enhanced the 
use of a structured communication technique known as 
the situation background assessment recommendation 
(SBAR) that nurses at Mountain Home incorporated 
into a “handoff reporting tool” to facilitate accurate 
these briefings have improved care coordination and 
decreased delays and cancellations of surgical cases.
Surgical briefings at Mountain Home have 
achieved results similar to those seen nationally, 
according to the facility’s leaders. For example, nurs-
ing turnover rates declined from 19 percent to 2 per-
cent among nursing staff in the operating room and 
post-anesthesia care unit in the period from 2008 
through 2010. Cumulative starting time delays fell 90 
percent in the main operating room, from a total of 11 
hours and 43 minutes at the end of the third quarter of 
fiscal 2008 to a total of one hour and 13 minutes by the 
end of the third quarter of fiscal 2010. 
Pilot-Testing Nursing Crew Resource 
Management at Mountain Home
The NCPS trained 200 Mountain Home staff on nurs-
ing CRM in March 2010, most of whom were nursing 
staff assigned to the pilot unit. Other clinical staff, 
including physicians, pharmacists, and social work-
ers (as well as nursing faculty from East Tennessee 
State University), also attended to learn about the 
program. According to nursing leaders, this team learn-
ing approach—combined with many physicians’ prior 
The VA’s Mountain Home Medical Center
The Mountain Home VA medical center includes 
a 114-bed teaching hospital that annually admits 
5,300 patients and conducts 4,130 surgeries. It also 
provides outpatient and long-term care on its campus 
and operates five community-based outpatient clinics 
in outlying cities and towns, linked by the VA’s EHR. 
Altogether, the medical center and affiliated clinics 
employ 2,000 full-time-equivalent staff, including 566 
nurses and 162 physicians, serving 194,000 eligible 
veterans living in a 41-county area encompassing 
portions of northeast Tennessee, southeast Kentucky, 
western North Carolina, and southwest Virginia 
(Exhibit 2). Mountain Home VA is affiliated with 
East Tennessee State University’s Quillen College 
of Medicine, which the VA helped develop on the 
Mountain Home campus.
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communication of patient information at the end of 
a shift. SBAR facilitates sequential, logical think-
ing and responsiveness when communicating critical 
information.31 
Following nursing CRM training, nurses at 
Mountain Home appear to be moving toward a more 
assertive communication style with medical staff (and 
other members of the care team) using techniques 
such as SBAR and the “three Ws” (Exhibit 6). “One 
of the key points of the training is that our main job as 
nurses is to do critical thinking,” says Elisa Broadway, 
R.N., M.S.N., a nursing manager at Mountain Home, 
“and I think that’s what physicians want, too.” Clinical 
leaders report that these communication tools greatly 
increase mutual accountability and effective communi-
cation among medical and nursing staff. 
Finding Additional Opportunities to 
Enhance Teamwork at Mountain Home
The Mountain Home VA has built on these national 
programs by developing local team-oriented innova-
tions to improve both patient safety and clinical qual-
ity of care. These include expanding the inpatient care 
team to include a team nurse and a clinical pharmacist 
and instituting a “discharge time-out” to facilitate bet-
ter transitions in care.
Improving Teamwork in the Hospital. Senior-
experience nurses have been reassigned to support 
patients and their families on inpatient care teams 
consisting of an attending physician, medical residents, 
and interns. (Previously, some of these nurses had 
performed case-management duties, which made it dif-
ficult for them to track and meet the needs of patients 
cared for by different physicians.) In their new role, 
the team nurses act as a liaison between the medical 
team and nursing staff by attending patient rounds 
(bedside meetings to review each patient’s progress), 
communicating with the patient and family to identify 
and resolve unexpressed needs or concerns (facilitated 
by the Daily Plan), and making a follow-up call within 
two days after a patient is discharged from the hospital 
to check on the patient’s recovery. 
This team nursing role reinforces the tenets of 
nursing CRM by giving the nurse the freedom and 
opportunity to “see what needs to be done for the 
patient through a nurse’s eyes that the doctors may 
not be aware of” and to “look longitudinally over the 
hospitalization to think, ‘what needs to be in place to 
have a successful transition?’” says Roger Jones, M.D., 
chief of medicine at Mountain Home. Through follow-
up contact, the nurse also may alert the patient’s ambu-
latory care team if early intervention is needed to avoid 
readmission.
In another pilot program, a clinical pharmacist 
has been assigned to the inpatient care team on a full-
time basis to review patients’ medications and attend 
daily patient rounds to offer advice on appropriate 
medication use. Based on experience and published 
research, the facility’s leaders expect that this expert 
advice will help the care team make better medication 
decisions, leading to a reduction in unnecessary drug 
use and fewer potentially harmful drug interactions.32 
The medical center plans to extend the clinical pharma-
cist program to all care teams in the future. 
Improving Transitions in Care. At most teaching hos-
pitals—including those in the VA system—the medi-
cal resident (physician in training) is responsible for 
discharging the patient. During routine follow-up with 
patients after discharge, Mountain Home nursing staff 
discovered that critical information was often miss-
ing from discharge plans and that there was a need for 
better communication during the discharge process. In 
response, Mountain Home instituted a policy change 
requiring the staff physician to meet with the medical 
resident to conduct a “discharge time-out” before the 
patient can be discharged. 
During the discharge time-out, the physician and 
resident review a discharge note constructed to ensure 
that all correct medications are listed, that the plans 
for going home are appropriate and accurate, and that 
interventions, follow-up care, and equipment are in 
place. The patient receives a copy of the note, which is 
available electronically to ambulatory care physicians 
in the VA system to facilitate follow-up care. While 
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physicians were at first resistant to this change in roles, 
they came to believe in its value as they saw how it 
improved the accuracy and timeliness of information 
and the coordination of care, according to Jones. The 
discharge time-out is now a hospitalwide requirement.
Results of Local Teamwork Innovations. Mountain 
Home’s clinical leaders believe that by improving 
teamwork and communication, these interventions 
contribute to a shorter length of stay (about 1.5 days 
less than average for a similar patient population) and 
a reported 10 percent reduction in the facility’s read-
mission rate since 2009. As a trade-off in pushing for 
a more thorough discharge process, fewer discharges 
have been occurring before noon—a performance met-
ric tracked across the VA. Nevertheless, Jones strongly 
believes that this trade-off in discharge timing is worth 
the benefits afforded by safer transitions in care. Levels 
of inpatient satisfaction have also increased over the 
last eight months, especially ratings of the respon-
siveness of staff, which leaders believe is related to 
improved communication supported by the Daily Plan. 
Physician leaders at Mountain Home report 
that the teamwork approach has integrated inpatient 
and outpatient care, because all personnel are working 
together toward the same goal. The ability to connect 
facilities and providers electronically also enables more 
coordinated care, such as electronic consultations when 
needed. 
OTHER RESULTS OF VA PATIENT SAFETY 
PROGRAMS
Fostering a Safety Culture 
To assess whether its efforts are effective in fostering a 
culture of safety, the NCPS developed a patient safety 
culture survey that it fielded in 2000, 2005, and 2009. 
The NCPS has seen significant improvements in staff 
ratings of the safety culture over the past four years 
on three of the survey’s 14 dimensions—staff morale 
(job satisfaction), perceptions of senior management’s 
awareness of patient safety and actions in promoting it, 
and perceived frequency of event reporting—as well 
as in a summary rating of the facility’s “overall patient 
safety grade” (Exhibit 9).33
Local VA facilities can use survey results to 
identify where they perform relatively poorly among 
a particular class of employees or in comparison to 
peer facilities. The Kansas City VA Medical Center, 
for example, saw a dramatic improvement in staff per-
ceptions of safety culture after undertaking a series of 
actions to enhance patient safety, such as improving 
communication with staff, involving senior manage-
ment in greeting patients, asking patients how safe 
they feel about their care, establishing a facility patient 
safety log, and improving root-cause analyses. The 
facility’s ratings rose from below-average performance 
on the 2005 survey to systemwide-average VA perfor-
mance four years later.34 
The VA reports that 129 (84%) of all VA facili-
ties improved their patient safety programs in fiscal 
year 2010, compared to 71 (46%) in 2008, as evi-
denced by the results of its Cornerstone Recognition 
Program.35 The program was launched in 2008 to offer 
nonmonetary awards (conferred by regional network 
leaders) to VA facilities based on the timeliness and 
quality of root-cause analyses (RCAs) conducted fol-
lowing critical safety events, and on how often the 
facility reported outcomes of actions taken. These data 
are reported to an electronic patient safety informa-
tion system and analyzed by NCPS, which identifies 
issues of common concern across facilities. To ensure 
that local safety programs maintain accountability and 
focus on priorities, an external panel reviews proposals 
from local facilities and makes recommendations for 
funding and other support from NCPS. 
•	 The percentage of RCAs completed within 45 
days (the Joint Commission standard to help 
assure that timely actions are identified and 
taken to correct unsafe conditions) rose from 
44.5 percent in fiscal 2006 to 97.8 percent in fis-
cal 2010 (Exhibit 10).36 
•	 RCAs characterized as having “strong strings” 
for improvement increased from 41.7 percent 
to 84.9 percent of all RCAs from fiscal 2006 
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to 2010. An RCA has a strong string if its root 
cause/contributing factor statement exhibits 1) 
an action judged to have stronger or intermedi-
ate strength in preventing the recurrence of simi-
lar events based on human factors engineering 
principles, 2) a quantifiable outcome measure, 
and 3) management concurrence on the action. 
Facilities with at least one “strong string” in 
every RCA increased from 6.5 percent in fiscal 
2006 to 42.4 percent in fiscal 2010. 
•	 RCAs conducted by facilities on a discretionary 
basis, when not required because of severity or 
probability of recurrence, rose from 5 percent 
of RCAs in the first two years of the program 
(fiscal 2000 and 2001) to nearly 23 percent in 
2010.37 This voluntary effort suggests to NCPS’s 
Bagian that a safety culture is taking hold in 
which facilities are internally motivated to 
improve safety.
Reducing Health Care–Associated 
Infections
As part of its commitment to the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement’s 100,000 Lives Campaign, 
the VA engaged its Inpatient Evaluation Center in 2005 
to support a systemwide initiative to reduce selected 
health care–associated infections in intensive care 
units (ICUs).38 The program consisted of five related 
components: 
1. A “kickoff” teleconference with clinicians and 
infection-control practitioners in the field during 
which three hospitals shared their experience 
in implementing a “bundle” of evidence-based 
practices to reduce infections in the ICU.
Exhibit 9. VA Patient Safety Culture Survey Results
Note: Results represent dimension means (except category 15 represents a single question) on a scale of 1 to 5. Bars with hashing indicate a signicant improvement 
from the previous period (p<.05). 
Source: VA National Center for Patient Safety (N=45,250 employee respondents in 2005 and 54,000 in 2009). 
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2. A Web site with resources including learning 
modules, guidance, procedures, and tools such 
as checklists to help local teams implement the 
interventions. 
3. A data-collection Web site for quarterly 
reporting on “bundle” adherence and infection 
rates using standard metrics defined by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
4. A help desk to support local efforts and 
mentoring for “struggling” sites (those with 
infection rates above the 75th percentile) to help 
them overcome barriers to change.
5. Inclusion of ICU infection rates in facility and 
regional leaders’ annual performance contracts 
to create accountability for results.
The initiative has contributed to a more than 
threefold reduction in reported systemwide rates 
of central line–associated bloodstream infections 
(CLABSI) and of ventilator-associated pneumonia 
(VAP) in VA medical center ICUs during the period 
from fiscal 2006 to 2010. Specifically, the CLABSI 
rate declined from 4.9 to 1.5 per thousand line days, 
while the VAP rate fell from 7.6 to 2.1 per thousand 
ventilator days during this period (Exhibit 11). The 
number of ICUs reporting no cases of CLABSIs rose 
from 35 in 2009 to 65 in 2010, while the number 
reporting no cases of VAP more than doubled from 
35 to 77 ICUs. By way of comparison, the CDC’s 
National Healthcare Safety Network reported that par-
ticipating medical/surgical ICUs in major teaching hos-
pitals had an average CLABSI rate of 2.1 per thousand 
line days and an average VAP rate of 2.9 per thousand 
ventilator days during 2006–2008 (the latest available 
benchmarking data).39
In January 2007, the VA secretary directed all 
VA medical centers to implement an initiative to reduce 
health care–associated infections caused by MRSA 
(methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus), which 
is a growing problem in many health care settings.40 
The MRSA Prevention Initiative was modeled after a 
successful program developed by the VA Pittsburgh 
Healthcare System using industrial engineering prin-
ciples of the Toyota Production System and was propa-
gated in 17 pilot sites.41 It included four related compo-
nents, which became known as the MRSA Bundle:
Exhibit 10. Timeliness and Quality of Root Cause Analyses 
Conducted by VA Medical Centers
RCAs = root cause analyses. Note: Data on “strong strings” represent the average of regional network 
averages for 2007–2009. A “strong string” means that the RCA possesses: 1) an action with stronger or 
intermediate strength; 2) a quantiable outcome measure; and 3) management concurrence on the action.
Source: VA National Center for Patient Safety (data for 2006–2009 were reported in the Department of 
Veterans Affairs, 2010 VA Facility Quality and Safety Report).
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1. Active surveillance for MRSA through 
screening cultures from nose swabs of all 
patients admitted and discharged from targeted 
hospital units (starting in intensive care units 
and eventually expanding to all acute-care units 
except for inpatient psychiatry).
2. Use of contact precautions (e.g., gloves, mouth/
nose/eye protection, gowns) for interactions 
with patients colonized or infected with MRSA.
3. Training of staff on proper hand hygiene for all 
patients, using a VA program called “Infection: 
Don’t Pass It On.”
4. Encouragement of culture change so that 
preventing infections is perceived as 
“everyone’s job and thus a natural component of 
care at each patient encounter each day.” 
The VA reported that monthly rates of health 
care–associated MRSA infections declined by 76 per-
cent in ICUs and by 28 percent in other acute-care 
units of VA medical centers from October 2007, when 
the initiative was fully implemented, to June 2009.42 
Researchers who interviewed program coordinators at 
17 facilities reported that barriers to implementation 
included staff resistance and supply issues, while facili-
tating factors included staff communication and the 
presence of an “MRSA champion” on each unit. The 
coordinators reported that culture change had been nec-
essary for success, but indicated that less than complete 
transformation took place during the pilot, suggesting 
that further improvement may be possible.43 
Measuring and Reporting Systemwide 
Performance for Accountability and 
Improvement 
The VA Inpatient Evaluation Center also has developed 
and validated methods for measuring risk-adjusted 
outcomes among intensive care patients in VA medi-
cal centers, using clinical data from the VA’s EHR 
to account for patients’ severity of illness and risk 
of dying.44 The center reports standardized mortality 
ratios (observed to expected deaths), both for deaths 
that occurred in the hospital and within 30 days of 
admission, as well as risk-adjusted (observed minus 
expected) length of stay for ICUs on a quarterly basis. 
Benchmarks are calculated by ICU type and severity 
level.45 The center started in 2004 as a pilot program in 
six regions and expanded to all 21 VA regions by 2006. 
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Exhibit 11. Rates of Health Care-Associated Infections in Veterans Affairs Intensive Care Units 
Source: Department of Veteran Affairs, Inpatient Evaluation Center.
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It recently expanded its measurement and reporting to 
encompass all medical/surgical acute-care patients. 
From the fiscal 2002–2004 baseline period 
to 2010, risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality declined 
by about 20 percent, and 30-day mortality by about 
33 percent, across all VA ICUs (Exhibit 12).46 This 
improvement, which was seen across all risk groups, 
was concurrent with efforts to improve quality of 
care and reduce health care–associated infections. 
“The ability to link outcomes to process improvement 
increases the likelihood that the improved processes 
will be maintained,” noted Marta Render, M.D., the 
center’s director. Mortality also fell by one-quarter 
among patients transferred to ICUs from other acute-
care units, suggesting that facilities have improved the 
ability to detect patients at risk of clinical deterioration 
and intervene as appropriate, such as through the use of 
rapid response teams.47
Managers use these outcomes, along with read-
mission rates, to assess quality, efficiency, and avail-
ability of care in a region. For example, length of stay 
that is longer than expected based on patients’ severity 
of illness indicates an opportunity to improve effi-
ciency.48 Lower-than-expected in-hospital mortality, 
paired with higher-than-expected 30-day mortality and/
or readmissions, may indicate a facility is discharg-
ing patients too soon. On the other hand, higher-than-
expected in-hospital mortality, paired with lower-than-
expected 30-day mortality, may indicate an insufficient 
supply of postacute care and palliative care resources 
in a region.
These metrics are part of broader performance 
dashboards that allow the VA’s managers to assess per-
formance at the national, regional, and facility levels. 
Results are color-coded to indicate facilities that are 
performing better or worse than systemwide averages 
or achievement targets. Underperforming facilities 
receive oversight, starting with telephonic consultation 
and escalating to onsite visits, as needed, to identify 
causes of deficiencies and take corrective action. As 
part of a recently announced transparency program, the 
VA is now making its dashboards publicly available 
Exhibit 12. Standardized Mortality Ratios for Patients 
Treated in Veterans Affairs Intensive Care Units
Ratio of observed to expected deaths
Source: Department of Veterans Affairs, Inpatient Evaluation Center.
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on its Web site (www.hospitalcompare.va.gov) to pro-
mote public accountability and help drive continuous 
improvement in care.
Reducing Surgical Complications  
and Mortality
Responding to concerns about surgical quality in VA 
medical centers, Congress in 1986 required that the VA 
report risk-adjusted surgical outcomes as compared 
with a national average. Because no methods or data 
for such reporting then existed, the VA developed them 
over a number of years starting in 1991. Those efforts 
culminated in the creation of the National Surgical 
Quality Improvement Program in 1994 to “provide 
the surgeons and managers in the field with reliable 
information, benchmarks, and consultative advice that 
will guide them in assessing and continually improv-
ing their local process and structures of care.”49 The 
program was subsequently adapted to the private sec-
tor under the auspices of the American College of 
Surgeons.50
•	 The average postoperative mortality rate mea-
sured 30 days after major (noncardiac) surgery 
in VA medical centers declined from 3.16 per-
cent of patients in the initial 1991–1995 period 
to 1.31 percent by fiscal year 2009 (Exhibit 13), 
a 59 percent improvement. As described earlier, 
implementation of medical team training and 
checklist-guided briefings have contributed to 
lower postsurgical mortality since they were ini-
tiated in VA medical centers in 2006. 
•	 Similarly, the VA’s average postoperative 
morbidity rate of complications—pneumonia, 
respiratory failure, stroke, renal failure, surgical 
site infections, or myocardial infarction (heart 
attack)—occurring within 30 days of major non-
cardiac surgery fell from 17.4 percent of patients 
in 1991–1993 to 10.6 percent in 1996 and 
declined further to 8.53 percent in 2009, repre-
senting a 51 percent improvement over 1991.51
Exhibit 13. VA Surgical Quality Improvement Program: 
30-Day Postoperative Mortality Rate at VA Medical Centers
Note: Results are based on samples of patients who underwent general, orthopedic, urologic, vascular, 
neurologic, otolaryngologic, thoracic, or plastic surgery at a VA medical center during the specic time period.
Sources: Data for 1991–2008 were reported by the Congressional Budget Ofce, Quality Initiatives Undertaken 
by the Veterans Health Administration, Aug. 2009, p. 17. Data for 2009 were reported in the 2010 VA Facility 
Quality and Safety Report, Jan. 2011, p. 22.
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THEMES AND INSIGHTS  
Improving Patient Safety Requires 
Leadership and Accountability at  
Multiple Levels
At the VA, leaders at all levels—executive, administra-
tive, and clinical—help to foster a culture of safety by 
implementing and modeling specific safety practices. 
At the Mountain Home VA, for example, clinical and 
facility leaders promote open communication, allow 
staff to innovate, and support the application of tools 
and training offered by the national office. In addition, 
executives at the VA are expected to achieve certifica-
tion as mentors and coaches in leadership and quality 
improvement methods.
Leadership commitment is reinforced through 
the VA’s performance evaluation system, which offers 
a financial bonus at both regional and local levels for 
achieving agreed-upon goals related to patient safety, 
among other performance dimensions. Nonmonetary 
recognition, such as the opportunity for facilities to 
earn a Cornerstone Award for improved root-cause 
analyses, can also be a strong motivator for change. “It 
is remarkable that the desire of individuals—especially 
facility directors—to be recognized…has resulted in 
an unbelievable increase in interest in the day-to-day 
operation of their patient safety program,” NCPS’s 
Bagian says. 
At the highest level of the organization, the 
VA’s undersecretary for health hosts a morning report 
among senior staff during which safety concerns can 
be brought forward and given attention in order to 
foster understanding of their importance alongside 
operational issues, according to William Duncan, 
M.D., Ph.D., the associate deputy undersecretary for 
health. The VA’s national office and regional leadership 
also monitor performance metrics to identify under-
performing facilities and intervene as needed, though 
delays in data collection can be problematic.52 The 
VA’s National Center for Organizational Development 
is examining whether employee surveys on safety cul-
ture and other issues also can be used as leading indica-
tors to alert managers to the need for action at facilities 
that may be at risk of poor quality and outcomes. 
At the same time, local facility leaders must cre-
ate an environment that is receptive to new practices 
and changing norms of behavior. Leaders must elimi-
nate the element of fear by allowing staff to voice con-
cerns without punishment. Staff, particularly nurses, 
find relief in formalizing safety practices because it 
empowers them to call attention to often long-held 
concerns. Facility leaders—administrative and clini-
cal—need to demonstrate through concrete behaviors 
that it is acceptable for everyone to question without 
fear, especially in a public system subject to higher lev-
els of public scrutiny. 
“I sometimes tell the nurses, ‘You need to be 
the bad guy’” when it comes to being assertive about 
patient safety concerns, says Charlene Ehret, M.P.A., 
Mountain Home VA medical center’s director. Rather 
than seeking to avoid healthy conflict, Ehret says, “I 
want people [on the medical staff] to come to me and 
say, ‘That nurse is trying to tell me what to do’”—a 
sign that a more assertive style is taking hold among 
nurses and that the culture is changing.
Collaboration and Teamwork Are Key 
Ingredients in Culture Change
Safety initiatives at Mountain Home focus on improv-
ing communication, empowering frontline staff, and 
facilitating collaboration so that all staff—nurses in 
particular—are given a voice in improving patient care. 
Although the emphasis is on patient safety, nursing 
leaders report that these efforts improve overall com-
munication between nurses and physicians and develop 
a stronger sense of teamwork that has the effect of lev-
eling the organizational hierarchy.53
Mountain Home’s leaders emphasize the impor-
tance of engaging nurses and physicians together in 
patient safety efforts. “Collaboration is an important 
part of the culture of change,” says Linda McConnell, 
R.N., M.S.N., associate director for patient care at 
Mountain Home. “Collaboratively, the physician and 
the nurse are at the bedside day to day. They can reflect 
on why it’s important to communicate and think, 
‘patient safety first.’”
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Discrete Projects “Add Up” to Help 
Transform Organizational Culture and 
Patient Care
The Mountain Home VA began with discrete initia-
tives—in the form of pilots and individual unit-based 
projects—that have cumulatively contributed to a facil-
ity-wide transformation. An initial focus on specific 
patient safety interventions transcended into a broader 
focus on improving overall organizational performance 
and culture—an approach that has permeated  daily 
management and practice to improve the quality and 
efficiency of care as well as morale at the institution, 
according to the facility’s leaders. Systems improve-
ment practices have spread beyond the specific initia-
tives for which they were first introduced. For instance, 
during morning reports at Mountain Home, it is now a 
normal part of the conversation to ask for a checklist 
to facilitate greater reliability in any process requiring 
standardization.
Ehret and other leaders acknowledge that the 
organization must sometimes learn through the hard 
experience of mistakes. For serious events, the medical 
center convenes a “cure team” that assesses root causes 
and devises a corrective action plan within 24 hours to 
prevent the mistake from recurring. “We always say, 
‘What could we learn from this, and how could we do 
better?’ You learn by fire sometimes,” Ehret says.
Duncan cites the fact that the VA’s staff are 
increasingly reporting and conducting root-cause 
analyses on near misses, or close calls (events that 
could have caused harm), as an indication that a safety 
culture is taking hold in a concerted way within local 
facilities. Joseph Francis, M.D., M.P.H., the VA’s chief 
quality and performance officer, sees team training as 
part of an evolution in the VA’s safety program that 
is translating the systems engineering focus on root 
cause analyses into a broader philosophy of human 
performance.
Physicians and nurses at the Mountain Home 
VA appear to take great pride in their jobs and in their 
roles as caregivers for veterans, and are therefore 
continually looking for ways to improve safety and 
quality. Roger Jones, M.D., Mountain Home’s chief 
of medicine, notes that he left private practice and 
university leadership positions to join the VA because 
of his desire to practice in an innovative environment. 
The facility’s commitment to patient safety is evident 
in the decision to expand discharge time-outs to reduce 
readmissions despite the resulting delay in the time of 
day of discharge. Sustaining this trade-off has required 
understanding and support from leaders at higher lev-
els of the VA. “Quality is a dialogue”—it starts with 
measurement and numbers but requires a conversation 
to understand the context for improvement, Francis 
notes.
As Mountain Home leaders plan to enhance 
a medical home model of primary care delivery in 
the outpatient setting, they are applying strategies 
and lessons learned from patient safety initiatives. In 
particular, they are focusing on how to translate com-
munication, coordination, and collaboration practices 
developed in their safety efforts to the outpatient set-
ting. The medical center’s leaders also report a shift 
in expectations among younger veterans, who are 
more active in requesting specific kinds of treatment 
and wanting to be involved in their care. Mountain 
Home executives say that the challenge of meeting 
these expectations is a welcome one, as doing so in a 
determined way can ultimately reinforce the facility’s 
efforts at transformation.
Organizational Supports and Integrated 
Delivery Facilitate Investments in  
Patient Safety
The advantage of a national delivery system lies in 
the ability to offer resources across facilities, draw-
ing on knowledge from both local experts and the 
national office to replicate expertise at each local site 
through tools, training, data feedback, and opportuni-
ties to participate in pilot programs. The VA’s National 
“Quality is a dialogue—it starts with measurement 
and numbers but requires a conversation to 
understand the context for improvement.”
Joseph Francis, M.D., M.P.H., VA Chief 
Quality and Performance Officer
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Center for Patient Safety has helped the organization 
apply its philosophy and skills—such as “just culture” 
and human factors engineering, along with practical 
tools, algorithms, and templates—at the local level. In 
other cases, such as the development of risk-adjusted 
ICU mortality measures and the MRSA Prevention 
Initiative, innovations have come from the field as 
various facilities or regions within the VA’s network 
develop and test new approaches and then spread them 
with central office support.
Patient safety efforts also benefit from the VA’s 
prior investment in creating a robust EHR system, 
which facilitates coordination of care between inpatient 
and outpatient settings and enables interventions such 
as the ability to create a standardized Daily Plan. The 
VA’s leaders also see the need for enhancing its infor-
mation technology capabilities to provide real-time 
performance feedback and more sophisticated decision 
support tools, such as highly calibrated clinical remind-
ers triggered by health factors in the EHR.
Implementing broad-based, systemic safety 
strategies requires a shift in emphasis from short-term 
to long-term thinking about the costs and benefits of 
care improvement. For example, some strategies for 
improving patient safety and quality of care may ini-
tially increase staffing costs. Mountain Home hired 
additional discharge nurses, staff to sit at the bedside 
to help prevent patient falls, and clinical pharmacists 
to participate more actively in bedside care. The medi-
cal center’s leaders believe that these investments will 
pay for themselves in time through more efficient and 
higher-quality care. 
Because the VA is an integrated system that 
provides both financing and delivery of care, it realizes 
the financial benefits of clinical improvements such as 
reduced readmissions and fewer adverse drug events, 
as well as the benefit to patients of safer care and fewer 
return trips to the hospital. Integrated delivery systems 
must maintain a healthy tension between reducing 
unwarranted variation as they strive to create highly 
reliable processes across the organization and recog-
nizing the benefits of allowing local facilities some 
freedom to innovate in meeting local needs in ways 
that may be adaptable elsewhere, says Francis. 
Implications for the Broader Health System
The VA is a challenging environment in which to 
implement patient safety initiatives. It serves a histori-
cally vulnerable patient population, with multiple com-
plex conditions and higher rates of poverty than the 
nation as a whole. Moreover, many VA patients also 
receive care outside the VA system, creating challenges 
for care coordination. Although the VA has not fully 
overcome those challenges, its leadership and achieve-
ments in the patient safety arena offer support for the 
proposition that organizational transformation is pos-
sible even in challenging settings. “This is not rocket 
science,” Ehret says. “This is doing the right thing for 
the patient—always thinking first about the patient, 
thinking about what’s right for the VA, thinking about 
what’s right for the employees that you are responsible 
for. It’s good common sense.”
The need for a systemic approach to patient 
safety in a complex national organization spurred the 
VA to build a model for change that engaged local 
facilities to test and adapt national initiatives to their 
local environment. While every local VA medical cen-
ter has adopted national programs to some degree, vari-
ability in efforts undertaken and success achieved per-
sists across the organization, offering opportunities for 
cross-site learning and improvement.54 Facilities such 
as Mountain Home appear to have excelled in stepping 
up to the challenge of making safety programs their 
own, bolstered by a strong commitment to improve-
ment among facility leaders and staff. Such examples 
reflect the importance of inculcating in local leadership 
and culture a commitment to realizing the core mission 
of an organization. 
Many of the patient safety approaches devel-
oped by the VA are potentially replicable outside the 
VA, and might be propagated through learning net-
works or collaboratives among independent institu-
tions. For example, the VA’s use of its EHR system to 
develop risk-adjusted mortality and other performance 
metrics presages what may become possible more 
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broadly across the health system as hospitals and 
physicians implement similar health information tech-
nology. But performance data alone are not enough; 
they must be combined with leadership and account-
ability to motivate improvement. “You have to put the 
data to use, and there must be consequences if you 
don’t improve,” said Peter Almenoff, M.D., assistant 
deputy undersecretary for health for quality and safety. 
Overall, the VA’s experience underscores that achiev-
ing widespread uptake of patient safety initiatives and 
culture will require similar organizational commitment, 
driven by local institutional culture and governance 
and reinforced through board oversight and public 
accountability mechanisms. 
CONCLUSION
In summary, the VA’s experience demonstrates how the 
leaders of an integrated delivery system can provide 
direction, expertise, tools, and accountability for suc-
cessful systemic change at the local level. Its experi-
ence may be applicable to other integrated delivery 
systems and to multi-hospital systems, collaborations, 
and other virtually organized groups that seek to har-
ness and share central resources to disseminate patient 
safety improvement strategies. The fact that many phy-
sicians receive some medical training in VA facilities 
may help pave the way for other health care organiza-
tions to adopt similar approaches as they seek to foster 
a culture of safety. 
A summary of findings from all case studies in this series, Keeping the Commitment: A Progress Report on Four 
Early Leaders in Patient Safety Improvement, will be available in spring 2011 on www.commonwealthfund.org.
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Appendix	A.	Generic	Preoperative	Briefing	Guide
VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 
Preoperative Briefing Guide for Use in the Operating Room 
 Read and Verify Checklist, Local Facilities Decide When Checklist Completed. 
*This checklist contains the elements of the WHO checklist and also includes a sampling of 
the majority of elements as suggested by frontline OR teams from the VHA.  The WHO 
Surgical Safety Checklist is available at 
http://www.safesurg.org/uploads/1/0/9/0/1090835/sssl_checklist_finaljun08.pdf 
1VHA Policy/Directive, 2WHO Checklist, 3Joint Commission, 4Medical Team Training 
        
 
 
 
 Patient Name1-4 
 
 Social Security #, Birthdate, 
or Other VA-Approved  
Identifier1 
 
 Names & Roles of Team  
      Members2 
 
 Procedure1-4 
 
 Surgical Site1-4 
 Marked or on Wristband 
 
 Laterality/Side1-4 
 
 Known Allergy2 
 No 
 Yes 
 
 Anesthesia2 
 Difficult Airway, 
     Aspiration Risk? 
 No 
 Yes 
  If Yes, Equipment & 
            Assistance Available 
 Safety Check Completed 
 Pulse Oximetry 
 
 Instruments & Special 
Equipment2-4 
 N/A 
 Yes 
 
 Implant (s) 1,4 
 N/A 
 Yes 
 If Yes, Specifics 
 
 Pertinent Lab Results 
 
 Risk of >500 ml Blood 
Loss2,4 
 
 No 
 
 Yes, and adequate IV 
access and fluids  
planned, and blood 
availability confirmed 
 
 If Yes, 
 
       Type & Screen 
 
       OR 
 
       Type & Cross 
 
       Prophylactic Antibiotics  
           Given Within 60 Minutes of  
           Incision2-4 
             Yes 
             N/A 
 
       DVT Prophylaxis4 
             Yes 
             N/A 
 
       Anticipated Critical Events2 
            Surgeon 
            Anesthesia 
            Nursing 
 
       Postop Disposition & Bed 
           Availability4 
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Appendix	B.	Mountain	Home’s	Surgical	Briefings	Checklist
     Prior to /after Induction                                    Before the Incision      Before the patient leaves the OR
PREOPERATIVE BRIEFING
o Roll Call 
o Patient confirms identity, site, procedure & 
consent 
o Any known allergies
o Site marked or arm band in place
o Patient positioning 
o Difficult airway/aspiration risk
o ASA Classification  
o Fire Risk Score __________
o Prophylactic antibiotics given
o VTE chemoprophylaxis given 
o Pneumo stockings on 
o Special equipment/supplies available
o Blood products available
o Correct Implants available
o X-Ray available 
o Safety Topic
_____________________________
Surgical Scrub Checklist:
o Do you have all the instruments?
o Any instruments missing?
o All instruments working?
o What special instruments do we need?
o Any questions about instruments
TIME OUT
Surgeon, Anesthesia, Resident, Scrub 
Technician, & Nurse Confirm:
o Patient full name
o Patient full SS#
o Scheduled Procedure
o Site Marked and Visible
o Valid Consent
o Proper Position
o Sterility confirmed
o Correct Implants noted
PATIENT SAFETY CHECKS EVERY 2-4 HOURS
o Antibiotic re-dosing?
o Position re-check
o Glucose check (for diabetics)
o Patient temp
o SCDs functioning properly
o Blood/irrigation warmers operating 
correctly?
WAITING TIME DELAY EVENTS
Equipment:  ______________
Supplies:  ______________ 
OPERATIVE DEBRIEFING
Nurse verbally confirms with the team:
o Instrument, sponge and needle 
counts correct
o What procedure was per-
formed?
o How is the specimen to be 
labeled?
o Any changes in wound classifi-
cation?
o Any equipment malfunctions?
o Any changes in disposition of 
patient post surgery?
o Surgeon of Record
________________________
LESSONS LEARNED/OPPORUNITIES
__________________________________
__________________________________
SATISFICATION SCORE
1 Poor  3 Good  5 Excellent
Surgeon:  1  2  3  4  5
Anesthesia:  1  2  3  4  5 
Nursing:  1  2  3  4  5
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Appendix	C.	Medication	Administration	Checklist
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